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: Priority No. 2 
J U M S D I C T I O N A L S T A T E M E N T 
i 1 . 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(e)i 1996), where the dei^uuant in a district coi 11 1: • nal actioi . n 
appeal to the Court, of Appeals from a final order for anything other "than a first degree or 
capital felony offense. In the underlying case related to this appeal, Defendant/Appellant 
i.'lianmap In I i 'hamnap I w-ns convicted vsf possession of a dangerous weapon by a 
503(3)(a)(i)O'»*•- i111'". \ *.^ "«*h» uuiii is attached hereto ^ ^ i n ^ 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
I "he issues presented for review are as follows: • • 
; i. 10 Jteiliib:, il;e 
charge. This issue requires iiiliTfinlalioii n( I K.ili "! "ml. Ann "„ 7(> Ml MH| ^(iiHOlNnpp 
1997). < 'hamnap maintains that proper interpretation of the statute supports the determin-
ation that at the time of the alleged offense in this case, he was not a restricted person. 
Standard of Review: "The proper interpretation of a statute is a question of law 
which we review for correctness, according no deference to the magistrate's legal conclu-
sion." State v. Redd. 1999 UT 108, 1J10, 992 P.2d 986, 990 (Redd ID (citing Gutierrez v. 
Medley. 972 P.2d 913, 914-15 (Utah 1998); and State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 
1994)). 
B. Whether the conviction in this case violated Chamnap's due process rights 
and/or whether the statute violated the due process provision of the federal constitution. 
Standard of Review: f,A constitutional challenge to a statute presents a question of 
law, which we review for correctness. See State v. Mohi, 901 P.2d 991, 995 (Utah 1995). 
When addressing such a challenge, this court presumes that the statute is valid, and we 
resolve any reasonable doubts in favor of constitutionality. See Society of Separationists, 
Inc. v. Whitehead, 870 P.2d 916, 920 (Utah 1993); Mountain States Tel & Tel Co. v. 
Garfield County, 811 P.2d 184, 187 (Utah 1991)." State v. Lopes. 1999 UT 24 f6, 980 
P.2d 191, 193. 
PRESERVATION OF ARGUMENT 
The first issue is preserved in the record on appeal (R.) at 34-40, 115-21, 131-36; 
and the second issue is preserved at 124-30, 137-43. 
RULES, STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following statute and constitutional provision will be determinative of the 
issues on appeal: 
2 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503 <>app. 1997). 
U.S. Const, amend. XIV. 
Ihe text of those provisions is contained in the attached. Addendum R 
S I A I EMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature vi the Case, Course of Proceedings, Disposition in the Com t Below 
• *M March 28 ; 1^8, the state charged Chamnap with possession of a dangerous 
weapon by a restricted person, a third degree felon> offense i? v iolation of Utah Code 
•• (HOHiJ»lil I 'iiipp Ml''1), ||, I i "> . ;iic mal court held a 
prelim* *— * > tt'nn1 m (|ln ii1 \Hvl ind l' HI >J M" * 
Thereafter, 'the defense moved to quash the bindovcr and iu ui^nm ^ h >' on the 
basis that Chamnap was not a restricted person. (R. 34-40, 115-21, 13 l-3o.j *he trial 
duncd UiL monon. (R. 204-05.) 
;v * a motion to strike ^ .^un - - H .s n a M I ) as 
unconstitutional •" • . » . 
201-02.) The case proceeded to trial (R. 287-88), vviici^ , * ^^ * iound Cnaniiitr ::w^\ i 
charged. (R. 3 If N ^ \ugusl 4. 1990. the trial court entered final judgment in the matter 
and :yiiituiLL- nnap to an indeterminate prison term,.,,, not to exceed five vcar~ 'R 
HI'K | 0 » 
3 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. IN EARLIER PROCEEDINGS. THE STATE CHARGED CHAMNAP WITH 
DISCHARGE OF A FIREARM FROM A VEHICLE. 
Craig Black ("Black") testified at trial for the state as follows: Black is a police 
officer with West Valley City. (R. 345:91.) He is familiar with gang organizations in 
Salt Lake County, and he is acquainted with Chamnap. (See R. 345:93-100.) According 
to Black, at the time of the alleged offense in this case, Chamnap was affiliated with the 
Tiny Oriental Posse ("TOP") gang. (R. 345:101-02.) 
Black testified that in October 1997, prior to the events alleged in this matter, he 
was involved in an investigation concerning a drive-by shooting in the Lake Park 
Apartment Complex in West Valley City. (R. 345:102-03.) "We learned that there was a 
member of the OLG [Oriental Laotian Gangsters] who had been shot in the stomach 
during a drive-by shooting and, to cut to the quick of the chase of this, . . . the driver of 
the car that the shooter shot from was Mr. In." (R. 345:103.) The state filed Case No. 
971922258 against Chamnap (hereinafter "Case No. 971922258") and charged him with 
discharge of a firearm from a vehicle. (R. 345:103; see also R. 345:91, State's Trial 
Exhibit 1.) On January 23,1998, Chamnap entered a plea of guilty in connection with 
that charge. (See R. 345:91, State's Trial Exhibit 1.) The trial court scheduled Chamnap 
to be sentenced in the matter on August 7, 1998. (See R. 34; 204-05.) 
4 
B. THE FACTS IN THIS CASE CONCERN A SHOOTING THAT OCCURRED 
AFTER CHAMNAP PLED GUILTY TO DISCHARGING A FIREARM FROM 
A VEHICLE. BUT BEFORE SENTENCING IN THE MATTER. 
One week after Chamnap entered the guilty plea in Case No 971922258, a 
shooting occurred at the West Valley Billiards arcade. (R. 345:105-116.) Black was 
involved in investigating the matter. He went to Pioneer Valley Hospital, where victims 
of the shooting reportedly were receiving treatment for gunshot wounds. (R. 345:116.) 
Black had information that a car driven by Chamnap was in the parking lot at the 
hospital, and he had information that a gun may be hidden under a floor mat in the car. 
(R. 345:117-18.) Black encountered Chamnap in the emergency room waiting area and 
removed him to a breeze way area to talk to him. (R. 345:119.) During the questioning 
Chamnap told Black that members of the nOLGff entered West Valley Billiards and began 
firing at Chamnap and his friends. (R. 345:119.) Chamnap disclosed that he returned 
fire, and he had a gun in his car. (R. 345:120.) 
Black asked to search the car and Chamnap ultimately provided consent. (R. 
345:121-23.) The officers recovered a gun from the car, took possession of it, and 
continued the investigation with Chamnap at the police station. (R. 345:123-27.) 
Chamnap was charged with possession of a handgun by a restricted person. (R. 4-
5.) A jury found him guilty of the offense and the trial judge entered final judgment. (R. 
316; 318-19.) Additional facts relating to this appeal are set forth below. 
5 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Chamnap was charged with possession of a handgun by a restricted person under 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503(3)(a)(i). That section specifies that a person who "has been 
convicted of any felony offense" is a restricted person. At the time of the offense in this 
case, Chamnap had entered a guilty plea in connection with a prior felony matter, but he 
had not been sentenced. In considering application of Section 76-10-503(3)(a)(i), this 
Court will construe the terms in accordance with their plain meaning. The term 
"convicted" should be construed to mean final judgment, as set forth in the dictionary, 
statutory law, and case law. Thus, since Chamnap had only entered a plea in the prior 
felony matter, he had "not been convicted"; Chamnap was not a restricted person under 
Section 76-10-503(3)(a)(i). The statute is inapplicable to this matter. 
In the event this Court declines to interpret the term "convicted" in § 76-10-
503(3)(a)(i) to mean a final judgment of conviction, the conviction in this case violated 
Chamnap's due process rights where an element of the offense was susceptible of 
multiple meanings. Chamnap did not have a reasonable opportunity to know that his 
conduct was prohibited so that he could govern himself accordingly. 
In addition, the statute is unconstitutional in that various interpretations would 
allow the police and judges to apply the statute in an arbitrary manner and it would invite 




POINT I. SECTION 76-10-503(3)(a)ffl IS INAPPLICABLE TO THIS 
MATTER 
A. THE FACTS SUPPORT THAT AT THE TIME OF THE EVENTS IN THIS 
CASE. CHAMNAP WAS NOT "CONVICTED" OF A FELONY. 
A history of this case is relevant to a review of the issue on appeal. As of January 
30, 1998, the date of the alleged offense in this case, Chamnap had been charged with, 
and had entered a plea of guilty to, the offense of discharging a firearm from a vehicle in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-508 (Supp. 1997). The offense of discharging a 
firearm was alleged in a separate case, identified in the lower court as Case No. 
971922258. (R. 345:91, State's Trial Exhibit 1.) The trial court was scheduled to 
sentence Chamnap for the offense on August 7, 1998. (See R. 34; 204-05.) Pursuant to 
Utah law, the matter was punishable as a third degree felony offense. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-10-508(2) (Supp. 1997). 
As of January 30, 1998, a final judgment had not been entered in Case No. 
971922258 for the violation under Section 76-10-508. On that date, Chamnap was a 
victim in a shooting at the West Valley Billiard arcade. (R. 345:105-16.) Chamnap 
admitted that in connection with the shooting at the arcade, he returned fire. (R. 345:132, 
State's Exhibit 17.) He also admitted that he was in possession of a handgun. (Id.) 
Thereafter, the state filed an Information in this matter against Chamnap for possession of 
a handgun by a restricted person in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503(3)(a)(i) 
7 
(Supp. 1997). (R. 4-5.) Chamnap's status as a restricted person was based solely on his 
plea of guilty in Case No. 971922258, since no judgment of conviction had been entered 
in that matter. (See R. 345:91, State's Trial Exhibit 1.) 
B. THE TERM "CONVICTED" IS DEFINED AS THE FINAL JUDGMENT IN 
A CRIMINAL CASE. 
The statute at issue in this case is Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503(3)(a)(i) (Supp. 
1997).1 It provides the following: 
(3)(a) A person may not purchase, possess, or transfer any handgun described in 
this part who: 
(i) has been convicted of any felony offense under the laws of the United States, 
this state, or any other state[.] 
In considering that provision, the trial court ruled that § 76-10-503(3)(a)(i) was 
applicable to this matter. According to the lower court, Chamnap's guilty plea in Case 
No. 971922258 for a third degree felony offense was sufficient to support the determina-
tion that Chamnap "[had] been convicted" of a "felony offense," even though Chamnap 
had not been sentenced on the matter and the trial court had not entered a judgment of 
conviction for a felony offense in the case. (R. 204-05; 345:91, State's Exhibit 1.) The 
trial court misapplied the statute. In reviewing the matter on appeal, this Court will pro-
vide no deference to the trial court's ruling. Redd IL 1999 UT 108 T|10, 992 P.2d at 990. 
1 In 1999, the legislature amended portions of the statute. Those amendments are not 
relevant to the issue on appeal in this case. Since this Court will apply the law as it 
existed at the time of the alleged offense, see Redd IL 1999 UT 108 ^ 4 n.2, 992 P.2d at 
988, Chamnap has relied on the version of the statute in effect in January 1998. 
8 
1. The Legislature and the Dictionary Have Defined the Term "Convicted." 
To consider the proper interpretation of a statutory provision, this Court will begin 
its analysis with the plain language of the statute. "The fundamental rule of statutory 
construction is that statutes are generally to be construed according to their plain 
language. Unambiguous language in the statute may not be interpreted to contradict its 
plain meaning." ReddIL 1999 UT 108 HI 1, 992 P.2d 986, 990 (citing Zoll & Branch P.C. 
v. Asav, 932 P.2d 592, 594 (Utah 1997)). To that end, this Court will rely on dictionary 
definitions "to divine the 'usual meaning5" of the statutory terms. State v. Redd, 954 P.2d 
230, 234 (Utah App. 1998) (ReddJ). 
Black's Law Dictionary defines the term "convicted" or "conviction" as follows: 
In a general sense, the result of a criminal trial which ends in a judgment or 
sentence that the accused is guilty as charged. The final judgment on a verdict or 
finding of guilty, a plea of guilty, or a plea of nolo contendere, but does not 
include a final judgment which has been expunged by pardon, reversed, set aside, 
or otherwise rendered nugatory. 
Black's Law Dictionary 333-34 (6th ed. 1990). 
The Utah legislature likewise has provided a definition in the Utah Code for 
"conviction." In the chapter entitled "The Judgment" for criminal proceedings, the 
legislature has specifically stated that "'[c]onviction' means judgment by a criminal court 
on a verdict or findings of guilty after trial, a plea of guilty, or a plea of nolo contendere." 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-9(3) (1995). 
Thus, the term "convicted" as used in § 76-10-503(3)(a)(i) means a judgment in a 
9 
criminal matter, whether guilt was determined by a verdict, trial court findings, or a plea. 
Since the court in Case No. 971922258 had not entered a judgment for a felony 
conviction in that matter as of January 30, 1998 (see R. 204-05; 345:91, State's Exhibit 
1), Chamnap was not a restricted person under § 76-10-503(3)(a)(i). 
2. If the Legislature Had Intended to Restrict Possession of a Handgun Before a 
Final Judgment of Conviction, the Legislature Was Capable of Expressing the 
Statutory Provision in Those Terms. 
In at least one respect, the legislature has demonstrated in the criminal code how it 
intends to construe the term"conviction." See Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-9(3) (1995). A 
conviction occurs at the time of judgment. Id. The legislature also has demonstrated an 
ability to express itself in terms of the verdict or a "plea of guilty." Id. Thus, if the legis-
lature had intended to restrict handgun possession under § 76-10-503(3)(a)(i) simply upon 
a finding of guilt without regard for the sentence or the way in which the matter would be 
recorded upon final judgment, the legislature could have expressed the matter in such 
terms. 
Instead, the legislature determined to identify a single, common, determinative 
point in criminal proceedings for defining the status of a restricted person under § 76-10-
503(3)(a)(i): When a person has been convicted of a felony offense. Since the legislature 
did not identify a restricted person simply as someone who has violated a felony offense, 
we can assume that the legislature intended something more than a determination of guilt 
on the matter. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-10-501(1) (Supp. 1997); 76-10-503(3)(a)(i). 
10 
3. Defining the Term "Convicted" as a Judgment Is Consistent with Other 
Provisions Relating to Section 76-10-503(3 Ya¥iV 
(a) The legislature intended the restrictive status to apply in limited 
circumstances. 
The legislature has expressly limited the circumstances in which a person may be 
restricted in his possession of a handgun. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-501(1), 
"[except] as specifically provided by state law," a person will not be restricted in his 
"constitutionally protected right" to own, possess, purchase or transport any firearm, or to 
keep any firearm in any vehicle under his control. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-501(1) 
(Supp. 1997); see also U.S. Const, amend. II. Thus, Section 76-10-503(3)(a)(i) should be 
interpreted to provide that a person is not restricted in his right to bear arms unless he 
"has been convicted" of a felony offense as reflected in a judgment of conviction. That 
interpretation would be consistent with the intent of the legislature as expressed in the act. 
(b) Subsection 76-10-503(3)(a)(i) should be interpreted to harmonize with 
other subsections of that statute. 
In interpreting Section 76-10-503(3)(a)(i), this Court will consider the language of 
the statute as a harmonious whole. See Redd I. 954 P.2d at 235. Thus, Subsection 
(3)(a)(i) should not be construed to make other provisions superfluous. See id. (citing 
Downer State Bank v. Major-Blackened Corp., 578 P.2d 1286, 1288 (Utah 1978)). 
To that end, this Court may consider the other provisions of § 76-10-503. Pursuant 
to Subsection 76-10-503(2)(a), the legislature has specified that a person who is "on 
11 
parole or probation for a felony" may not possess a dangerous weapon, including a 
firearm. Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503(2)(a) (Supp. 1997). According to the statute, a 
person who violates that provision "is guilty of a second degree felony" offense. Id at 
76-10-503(2)(b). 
At first glance, it appears that under certain circumstances, Subsections 76-10-
503(2)(a), (b) and Subsection 76-10-503(3)(a)(i) may proscribe identical conduct but 
provide different penalties. Specifically, both subsections provide that possession of a 
firearm/handgun2 by a restricted person — who is on parole/probation for, or who has 
been convicted of, a felony offense — is a second degree or third degree felony offense. 
Since many persons who have been "convicted" of a "felony offense" (§ 76-10-
503(3)(a)(i)) may be on parole or probation at some time for that offense (§ 76-10-
503(2)(a)), it is reasonable to distinguish application of those provisions as follows. 
The legislature has recognized that so long as a defendant is on parole or probation 
for an offense, an appropriate entity or the trial court will supervise defendant and will 
have continuing jurisdiction over the matter. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(2) (Supp. 
1997); see also Utah Code Ann. § 64-13-6(l)(g) (1996) (Department of Corrections shall 
supervise probationers and parolees). Under those circumstances, if defendant is found to 
2 Subsections 76-10-503(2)(a) and (b) prohibit possession of a firearm, which is defined 
to include a "pistol" or "revolver"; and Subsection 76-10-503(3)(a)(i) prohibits 
possession of a handgun, which is defined to include a "pistol" or "revolver." See Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-10-501(g) and Q) (Supp. 1997). 
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be in possession of a "dangerous weapon11 defined as a firearm, he will be charged with 
possession by a restricted person, a second degree felony offense. Utah Code Ann. § 76-
10-503(2)(b). 
Once the defendant has successfully completed parole and/or probation, his status 
as a restricted person changes. He simply may become a person "who has been convicted 
of any felony offense." Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503(3)(a)(i). In that instance, he is 
subject to fewer restrictions (§ 76-10503(3)(a)(i) restricts the possession of a handgun, 
while § 76-20-503(2)(a) restricts possession of a dangerous weapon, including a knife) 
and a lesser penalty if he violates the statute. By interpreting the separate, but similar, 
provisions in such a manner, this Court may avoid creating superfluous provisions and/or 
conflicts. Redd L 954 P.2d at 235 (citing Downer State Bank v. Major-Blackened Corp.. 
578 P.2d 1286, 1288 (Utah 1978)). 
It is plain that the legislature intended Subsections 76-10-503(2)(a) and (b) ~ with 
its harsher penalty for possession of a firearm - to apply when defendant has been placed 
on probation or parole, while Subsection 76-10-503(3)(a)(i) was intended to apply upon 
termination of parole and probation. Thus, in connection with Section 76-10-503(3)(a)(i), 
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the legislature contemplated the entry of a judgment of conviction on a felony offense.3 
(c) Subsection 76-10-503(3)(a)(i) should be interpreted so that it is not in 
conflict with other relevant statutes. 
A third degree felony offense may be recorded as a misdemeanor offense upon 
entry of final judgment. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402 provides the following: 
(1) If the court, having regard to the nature and circumstances of the offense of 
3 Pursuant to Subsections 76-10-503(3)(a)(iii), (iv), and (vi), the restricted status of a 
person does not hinge on a "conviction." Rather, those provisions restrict a person in his 
possession of a handgun if he is an "unlawful" user of drugs or drug dependent, or if he is 
an illegal alien. In construing those provisions, it is reasonable to require only a finding 
of guilt ~ that is, unlawful/illegal conduct - to support the restricted status. On the other 
hand, since Section 76-10-503(3)(a)(i) requires proof that defendant "has been 
convicted," that provision requires more than simply a showing that defendant's conduct 
was unlawful or illegal; it requires proof of a felony conviction. The difference in 
wording suggests the legislature intended that Subsection 76-10-503(3)(a)(i) require proof 
of something more than a determination of guilt; the legislature intended proof of a 
judgment of conviction. 
Also consider Subsection 76-10-503(l)(a). That provision specifies that the 
restricted status hinges on a conviction for a crime of violence. The crimes of violence 
relevant to application of Subsection 76-10-503(l)(a) are listed in Section 76-10-501(2). 
In State v. Gurr. 904 P.2d 238 (Utah App. 1995), this Court recognized that defendant's 
prior judgment of conviction for burglary, a crime of violence, triggered application of 
Subsection 76-10-503(l)(a). The defendant in that case argued that because the matter 
was reduced to a misdemeanor conviction for burglary, the conviction could not serve to 
support the determination that defendant was a restricted person. "Gurr's argument 
hinges on the distinction between felony and misdemeanor convictions." Gurr, 904 P.2d 
at 243. This Court was not persuaded by defendant's argument. "Gurr fails to recognize 
that the list of violent crimes includes 'an attempt to commit any of [the enumerated] 
offenses.' . . . Therefore, crimes of violence may well be misdemeanors." Id. While 
Subsection 76-10-503(l)(a) "restricts people from possessing dangerous weapons based 
on the substance rather than the classification of their criminal history," id., Subsection 
76-10-503(3)(a)(i) restricts people from possessing handguns based on the classification 
of their criminal history. 
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which the defendant was found guilty and to the history and character of the 
defendant, concludes it would be unduly harsh to record the conviction as being 
for that degree of offense established by statute and to sentence the defendant to an 
alternative normally applicable to that offense, the court may unless otherwise 
specifically provided by law enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower 
degree of offense and impose sentence accordingly. 
(2) If a conviction is for a third degree felony the conviction is considered to be for 
a class A misdemeanor if: 
(a) the judge designates the sentence to be for a class A misdemeanor and the sen-
tence imposed is within the limits provided by law for a class A misdemeanor; or 
(b) (i) the imposition of the sentence is stayed and the defendant is placed on 
probation, whether committed to jail as a condition of probation or not; 
(ii) the defendant is subsequently discharged without violating his 
probation; and 
(iii) the judge upon motion and notice to the prosecuting attorney, and a 
hearing if requested by either party or the court, finds it is in the interest of justice 
that the conviction be considered to be for a class A misdemeanor. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402 (1995). 
Section 76-3-402 authorizes a judge to reduce a matter at sentencing from a third 
degree felony offense to a misdemeanor offense. When the third degree felony offense is 
reduced, it is recorded as a misdemeanor offense. In that instance, "a guilty defendant 
who is considered worthy of a reduced sentence should receive all the advantages that go 
with such leniency." State v. Duncan, 812 P.2d 60, 63-64 (Utah App. 1991). 
If this Court were to construe a conviction under § 76-10-503(3)(a)(i) to occur at 
the time of the plea, without consideration for the fact that the trial judge has the 
discretion to enter the judgment of conviction for a reduced offense, the result would have 
the following effect: First, such an interpretation essentially would create an exception to 
Section 76-3-402, where the judgment of conviction would not be considered a 
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misdemeanor offense. Second, such an interpretation would have the effect of restricting 
a person from possessing a handgun based on the fact that his criminal history consists of 
a misdemeanor conviction. That is inconsistent with Section 76-10-503(3)(a)(i). Since 
the statute does not seek to restrict a person who has a misdemeanor conviction, or a 
person who simply has been found guilty of a felony offense without more, the statute 
should not be interpreted to apply prior to entry of a judgment of conviction. 
The term "convicted1' as used in Section 76-10-503(3)(a)(i) necessarily 
contemplates a final judgment where the statute restricts a person from possessing a 
handgun based on the level or classification of his criminal history. Thus, if a defendant 
pleads guilty to a third degree felony offense and the judge at sentencing reduces the 
matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402 to a Class A misdemeanor offense, the 
conviction is classified and recorded as a misdemeanor offense. In that instance, the 
record contains a conviction for a misdemeanor offense, notwithstanding the plea. 
Without the sentence and final judgment, the record as to whether defendant "has been 
convicted of any felony offense" is incomplete. 
Inasmuch as Section 76-10-503(3)(a)(i) seeks only to restrict a person who has 
been convicted of a felony offense, it is appropriate to require a final judgment of 
conviction on the matter to ascertain the appropriate classification of the offense. 
4. Chamnap Entered a Guilty Plea Pursuant to the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure: Those Rules Provide that Where Defendant Has Entered a Plea, a 
Conviction Occurs at the Time of Sentencing. 
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Chamnap entered a plea of guilty in Case No. 971922258 in accordance with the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. Pursuant to Rule 22(c), upon a plea of guilty, the trial 
court shall "impose sentence and shall enter a judgment of conviction which shall include 
the plea or the verdict, if any, and the sentence.1' Under the rules, the conviction includes 
the plea of guilty and the sentence. Inasmuch as the plea in this case was entered in 
accordance with the rules, it is reasonable to consider the rules in determining when a 
conviction has occurred. 
5. Utah Case Law Interprets "Convicted" to Mean a Judgment of Conviction. 
Utah case law recognizes that a conviction may be defined as a final judgment in a 
criminal case. In State v. Hunt, 906 P.2d 311, 313-14 (Utah 1995), the Utah Supreme 
Court acknowledged that the term "conviction" has two meanings. "[One meaning] 
denotes the establishment of 'guilt by verdict or plea' and one [meaning] refers to 'the 
final judgment entered on the plea or verdict."' Id at 313 (citing Duncan, 812 P.2d at 62). 
In determining which definition governs, courts must consider "the context and the 
purpose within which the term 'conviction5 is used." Hunt, 906 P.2d at 313 (citing 
Duncan, 812 P.2d at 62). 
In Hunt, the court considered the term "conviction" as it was used in the statute 
that prohibits the distribution of a controlled substance. There, defendant was charged in 
the information with three counts of distributing marijuana. According to Utah statute, 
the multiple counts subjected him to an enhanced sentence: "Any person convicted of 
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violating Subsection (l)(a) with respect to . . . (ii) a substance classified in Schedule III or 
IV, or marijuana, is guilty of a third degree felony, and upon a second or subsequent 
conviction punishable under this subsection is guilty of a second degree felony." Hunt, 
906 P.2d at 312 (citing Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(b) (1953 as amended)). 
Defendant argued that "the offenses resulting in the 'second or subsequent 
conviction9 must occur after entry of a first conviction for the penalty to be increased." 
Hunt, 906 P.2d at 312. That is, according to the defendant in Hunt, a "second or 
subsequent" offense may be charged as a second degree felony only if, at the time of the 
subsequent offense, defendant has been convicted of distributing on a prior offense. Id. 
The supreme court disagreed with defendant's interpretation. In drafting the 
distribution statute, the legislature specified that the sentencing enhancement was 
triggered upon imposition of the "second or subsequent conviction"; the phrase did not 
relate to the timing of the offenses, but to the "number of convictions and when they are 
entered." Hunt, 906 P.2d at 313. In addition, use of the term "second" supported the 
determination that the first and "second" offenses could be alleged in the same charging 
document. Thus, final judgment on both offenses could be entered simultaneously. 
Inasmuch as the legislature specified that the enhancement applied "upon a second or 
subsequent conviction," the Utah Supreme Court ruled that a conviction of guilt "on one 
count in an information can be a legal basis for enhancing other convictions based on 
counts charged in the same information." Hunt, 906 P.2d at 314. The term "conviction" 
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did not relate to a final judgment. 
The statute at issue in Hunt is distinguishable from the statute at issue in this case. 
Here, the phrase, "has been convicted of any felony offense," specifically relates to the 
timing and the disposition of the prior offense. Thus, unless defendant "has been 
convicted" of a "felony offense," he is not a restricted person and he may not be charged 
with a crime under Section 76-10-503(3)(a)(i). Also, this Court should consider the 
context and the purpose within which the term "convicted" is used. See Point I.B.I., 2., 
3., and 4., supra. Since the legislature did not seek to restrict a person from possessing a 
handgun based only on a determination that he has been found guilty of a felony offense, 
the term "convicted" must refer to "the final judgment entered on the plea or verdict." 
Hunt 906 P.2d at 313 (citing Duncan. 812 P.2d at 62). 
Next, in State v. EwelL 883 P.2d 1360, 1363 (Utah App. 1993), this Court 
considered a statute that used the term "convicted" and "sentenced" as different concepts 
in the same provision. Because the legislature seemed to use the terms as separate 
concepts, Judge Jackson stated in his concurring opinion that the legislature intended that 
the term "convicted" would relate to the establishment of guilt by plea or verdict, while 
the term "sentenced" would relate to sentencing. Id at 1364 (J. Jackson, concurring). 
Applying the same rationale to this case, the statute at issue here provides that 
defendant may not possess a handgun if he "has been convicted of any felony offense." 
By specifying that defendant is a restricted person due to the classification of his criminal 
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history, the legislature has indicated an intent to interpret the term "convicted" to mean 
the plea and the sentence. That is, since a guilty plea "can be modified or even nullified 
by subsequent events,11 Duncan, 812 P.2d at 63, the guilty plea does not reflect the 
classification of the conviction. The classification of the offense is recorded with the final 
judgment at sentencing. See State v. Theison. 709 P.2d 307, 308 (Utah 1985) (although 
defendant entered guilty plea to second degree felony offense, record failed to contain a 
conviction for a felony offense); Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402(1). Thus, the classification 
as a felony offense is reflected in the final judgment. 
The legislature sought to restrict possession of a handgun in limited circumstances, 
after defendant "has been convicted" of any felony offense. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-
10-501(1) and 76-10-503(3)(a)(i). The term "convicted" should be interpreted to refer to 
a judgment of conviction. Since Chamnap was not "convicted" of a felony offense at the 
time of the incident in this case, the statute did not apply to him. The trial court erred in 
failing to dismiss the charge against him. 
POINT II. IN THE EVENT THE TERM "CONVICTED." AS USED IN 
SECTION 76-10-503(3¥a¥n, IS NOT INTERPRETED TO MEAN FINAL 
JUDGMENT. CHAMNAP MAINTAINS THAT THE CONVICTION IN 
THIS MATTER VIOLATED HIS DUE PROCESS RIGHTS. AND/OR THE 
STATUTE IS VAGUE AND AMBIGUOUS. 
In the event this Court rules that the term "convicted" as used in Section 76-10-
503(3)(a)(i) refers to the establishment of guilt by a verdict or guilty plea rather than a 
judgment of conviction, Chamnap asserts that his conviction under Section 76-10-
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503(3)(a)(i) denied him due process of law because the statute did not give him adequate 
notice of the restricted status. See State v. Blowers. 717 P.2d 1321 (Utah 1986); U.S. 
Const, amend. XIV, § 1. In addition, the statute is unconstitutional. 
Basic principles of due process prohibit the enactment of a statute if it is vague and 
ambiguous. 
Vague laws offend several important values. First, because we assume that man is 
free to steer between lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist that laws give the 
person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is 
prohibited, so that he may act accordingly. Vague laws may trap the innocent by 
not providing fair warning. Second, if arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is 
to be prevented, laws must provide explicit standards for those who apply them. 
A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, 
and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant 
dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application. Third, but related, where a 
vague statute ffabut[s] upon sensitive areas of basic First Amendment freedoms,1' it 
"operates to inhibit the exercise of [those] freedoms." Uncertain meanings 
inevitably lead citizens to "'steer far wider of the unlawful zone ' . . . than if the 
boundaries of the forbidden areas were clearly marked." 
Gravned v. City of Rockford. 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972) (footnotes omitted); see also 
Kolenderv.Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983); Blowers, 717 P.2d at 1322-23; 
Greenwood v. City of North Salt Lake, 817 P.2d 816, 819 (Utah 1991). 
Thus, under Gravned a statute is unconstitutionally vague if one of the following 
conditions exists: the statute fails to (1) give fair notice to those persons potentially 
subject to it, (2) adequately guard against arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement, or (3) 
provide sufficient breathing space for First Amendment rights. The Supreme Court has 
declared a statute vague because of the unlimited discretion given to finders of fact, even 
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though no problem of fair warning existed. Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399 (1966). 
In applying the Grayned test to state legislation, the United States Supreme Court 
has expressed less tolerance for vague provisions that carry criminal penalties. Village of 
Hoffman Estates v. Flipside. Hoffman Estates. Inc.. 455 U.S. 489, 498-99 (1982). 
Our Constitution is designed to maximize individual freedoms within a frame 
work of ordered liberty. Statutory limitations on those freedoms are examined for 
substantive authority and content as well as for definiteness or certainty of 
expression. 
As generally stated, the void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal 
statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people 
can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage 
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Although the doctrine focuses both on 
actual notice to citizens and arbitrary enforcement, we have recognized recently 
that the more important aspect of the vagueness doctrine "is not actual notice, but 
the other principal element of the doctrine — the requirement that a legislature 
establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement." Where the legislature 
fails to provide such minimal guidelines, a criminal statute may permit Ma 
standardless sweep [that] allows policemen, prosecutors, and juries to pursue their 
personal predilections." 
Kolender. 461 U.S. at 357-58 (cites omitted): see also. State v. Lopez. 935 P.2d 1259, 
1265 (Utah App. 1997) (the void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a statute define an 
offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is 
prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory 
enforcement). 
When addressing a constitutional challenge to a statute, "this court presumes that 
the statute is valid, and we resolve any reasonable doubts in favor of constitutionality." 
State v. Lopes. 1999 UT 24 ^6, 980 P.2d 191,193; Lopez. 935 P.2d at 1262. Chamnap 
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maintains that a constitutional interpretation of the statute defines the term "convicted" to 
mean a final judgment. See Point I, supra. Any other interpretation supports the determin-
ation that the conviction in this case violated Chamnap's due process rights and the 
statute is capable of multiple meanings. Thus, it is void for vagueness where it fails to 
provide adequate notice and it encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. 
A. UNLESS THIS COURT INTERPRETS THE TERM "CONVICTED" IN $ 
76-10-503(3¥a¥r) TO REFER TO A FINAL JUDGMENT, THE CONVICTION 
IN THIS CASE VIOLATED CHAMNAP'S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS. ALSO, 
THE STATUTE IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL WHERE IT FAILS TO GIVE A 
PERSON OF ORDINARY INTELLIGENCE A REASONABLE 
OPPORTUNITY TO KNOW WHEN HE IS ACTUALLY A RESTRICTED 
PERSON AND IN VIOLATION OF THE STATUTE. 
The first consideration under Grayned is whether a statute gives a person of 
ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited so that he may 
govern himself accordingly. See State v. Blowers, 717 P.2d 1321, 1322 (Utah 1986) 
(vague penal law stricken under due process analysis). The statute must "define an 
'offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is 
prohibited." Greenwood. 817 P.2d at 819. Also, in considering whether a statute is 
vague, '"[the] determinative factor is whether there is a reasonable degree of common 
understanding of what is encompassed within the general terms of prohibition.'" State v. 
Owens. 638 P.2d 1182,1183 (Utah 1981) (citing State v. Samter. 479 P.2d 237, 239 
(Ore. 1971)). "[A] criminal violation should be described with sufficient certainty so that 
persons of ordinary intelligence, desiring to obey the law, may know how to govern 
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themselves in conformity with it." Owens, 638 P.2d at 1183. 
Unless this Court interprets Section 76-10-503(3)(a)(i) as set forth above, s.ee_ 
Point I, supra, the statute includes an element that is susceptible of multiple meanings, 
and is therefore vague. Specifically, Section 76-10-503(3)(a)(i) restricts a person's 
possession of a handgun if he has been "convicted" of a felony offense. As the supreme 
court recognized in Hunt, 906 P.2d at 313, the term "convicted" may relate to the 
establishment of "guilt by a verdict or plea," or it may relate to "the final judgment 
entered on the plea or verdict." IcL_ 
Among other things, the difference between the two definitions in this case 
consisted of a period in time of more than six months, where Chamnap pled guilty to the 
prior offense in January 1998, and was scheduled to be sentenced with entry of a final 
judgment in August 1998. 
Because the term has more than one meaning, an ordinary person would not 
understand when his status is restricted. Would the ordinary person be prohibited under 
Subsection 76-10-503(3)(a)(i) from possessing a handgun from the date of the plea? 
What if he withdraws the plea; is he still restricted in his possession of a handgun? What 
if he enters a plea and the judge records the matter as a misdemeanor conviction? Is he 
restricted under Subsection 76-10-503(3)(a)(i) in that instance, and if so, when does the 
restricted status begin and/or end? If it begins at the time of the plea, does it end when 
the matter is recorded as a misdemeanor? See Elks Lodges No. 719 (Ogden) and No. 
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2021 (Moab) v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control 905 P.2d 1189, 1202 (Utah 
1995) (a term susceptible of multiple meanings is vague if a person is unable to 
determine whether his conduct conforms to the statute). 
The language of the particular statute we are here dealing with is undoubtedly 
subject to the constitutional challenge of vagueness. That part of the statute 
'regardless of whether there is a legal basis for the arrest' may be subject to 
various meanings and interpretations [The] word 'interferes' as used in the 
statute without further definition or elaboration may mean any protest or verbal 
remonstration with an officer as well as the employment of physical force to avoid 
an arrest. We are of the opinion that the language of the statute as above pointed 
out fails to inform an ordinary citizen who is seeking to obey the laws as to the 
conduct sought to be proscribed. 
State v. Bradshaw. 541 P.2d 800, 801 (Utah 1975); see also State v. Krueger. 1999 UT 
App 54 ^ {27, 975 P.2d 489,496 (finding that term "delinquent" is not vague since it is a 
"well-known term sufficiently defined" by Utah case law). 
In focusing on the application of the statute to Chamnap's conduct, inasmuch as 
Chamnap entered a plea of guilty pursuant to the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, and 
inasmuch as the trial judge had the discretion to reduce a third degree felony offense to a 
misdemeanor offense upon entry of judgment, see Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402(1), a 
reasonable interpretation of the statute supported the determination that Chamnap was 
not a restricted person unless and until the trial judge in Case No. 971922258 entered a 
judgment for a felony conviction. 
In the event this Court is inclined to interpret the statute to apply upon entry of a 
guilty plea, Chamnap was not on notice in January 1998 of his restricted status. He had 
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no way to know that given the varying definitions for the term, his conduct constituted a 
violation of the statute. Thus, the conviction in this case violated Chamnap's due process 
rights. Blowers, 717 P.2d at 1321. 
B. SECTION 76-10-503 IS SUSCEPTIBLE TO ARBITRARY AND 
DISCRIMINATORY ENFORCEMENT. 
The second consideration under Grayned is whether the law provides sufficiently 
explicit standards for those who apply it in order that it will not be enforced in an 
arbitrary and capricious manner. A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy 
matters to police, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with 
the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application. In order that a statute 
may be constitutional, the legislature is required to establish minimal guidelines to 
govern law enforcement. Otherwise, it has provided a "standardless sweep [that] allows 
policemen, prosecutors, and juries to pursue their personal predilections." Kolender, 461 
U.S. at 357-58; Gravned. 408 U.S. at 109. 
Since the statute at issue here contains an element that is susceptible to varying 
interpretations, it impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to judges for resolution on 
an ad hoc and subjective basis. The vague provisions of § 76-10-503(3)(a)(i) may be 
used improperly by judges who might be consciously or subconsciously inclined to dis-
criminate against certain classes of individuals. See e.g., Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108-09. 
In addition, because the legislature has expressed a desire to limit the 
circumstances of the restricted status, see Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-501(1) (Supp. 1997), 
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then simultaneously has expressed § 76-10-503(3)(a)(i) in terms that are susceptible of 
varying interpretations, the legislature in effect has presented judges with the opportunity 
to selectively enforce the statute. 
In his concurring opinion in Blowers, Justice Howe recognized the following with 
respect to vague statutes: 
It would certainly be dangerous if the legislature could set a net large enough to 
catch all possible offenders, and leave it to the courts to step inside and say who 
could be rightfully detained, and who should be set at large. This would, to some 
extent, substitute the judicial for the legislative department of the government. 
Blowers, 717 P.2d at 1324 (Howe, J., concurring) (citing, U.S. v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 
221, 23 L.Ed. 563 (1875)). Section 76-10-503(3)(a)(i) casts a large net by failing to de-
fine important elements vis-a-vis an individual's "right to keep and bear arms." See Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-10-501(1) (Supp. 1997). The "net" leaves the courts to decide in an 
arbitrary manner how the statute will be applied and enforced. 
Consider three separate defendants, who have entered a guilty plea to a third 
degree felony offense but have not been sentenced. With respect to the first defendant, a 
judge may construe the statute to support the determination that until a judgment is 
entered recording the matter as a felony conviction, the first defendant is not a restricted 
person. With regard to the second defendant, a judge may construe the statute to support 
the determination that even though a judgment of conviction has not been entered, the 
second defendant is restricted regardless of the classification of the offense upon final 
judgment. With respect to the third defendant, a judge may construe the statute to 
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support the determination that the defendant is a restricted person only until the entry of 
final judgment where the judge intends to reduce the offense to a misdemeanor 
conviction. The third scenario may invite additional abuse where a judge, intending to 
enter judgment for a misdemeanor conviction (see Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402), may 
delay sentencing for the purpose of temporarily restricting the defendant in his right to 
possess a handgun. 
As for the defendant, if he is restricted from possessing a handgun under Section 
76-10-503(3)(a)(i) after entry of a guilty plea, he may decide not to enter such a plea -
even if it otherwise would be in the best interest of all parties - in order to maintain 
lawful possession of a handgun. In the alternative, after entering the plea, the defendant 
may move to withdraw it in order to evade the restrictive status. Assuming the defendant 
could otherwise establish a legitimate basis for withdrawing the guilty plea, if he is 
motivated to do so in order only to evade the restrictive status, such a strategy may 
temporarily allow him to lawfully maintain possession of a handgun, but may otherwise 
compromise any other benefit that he or the state may hope to gain upon entry of the 
plea. If the statute is interpreted so that the restrictive status occurs prior to entry of a 
judgment of conviction, it may be subject to abuse and manipulation. 
C. THE LEGISLATURE SOUGHT TO LIMIT INTERFERENCE WITH 
AN INDIVIDUAL'S RIGHT TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS. 
The third consideration under Grayned is whether the statute inhibits the exercise 
of "basic First Amendment freedoms." Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108-09; see also Provo City 
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v. Whatcott 2000 UT App. 86, 391 Utah Adv. Rep. 22. While Section 76-10-
503(3)(a)(i) does not relate to First Amendment protections, it is plain that in enacting 
the statute, the legislature sought to protect a person's right to keep and bear arms under 
the Second Amendment. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-501(1) (Supp. 1997). Thus, broad 
application of Section 76-10-503(3)(a)(i) would impact on constitutionally protected 
conduct: A person's right to possess a handgun, where he has not been finally judged 
guilty on a felony offense. See U.S. v. Simpson, 435 U.S. 6,14-15 (1978) ("ambiguity 
concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity") (cites 
omitted). 
In the event this Court interprets Section 76-10-503(3)(a)(i) to apply the restrictive 
status prior to the entry of a judgment of conviction on a felony offense, the 
interpretation will be in conflict with the legislative intent set forth in Section 76-10-
501(1) (Supp. 1997). The statute must be narrowly interpreted to achieve its legislative 
purpose without interfering with the right to keep and bear arms. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, Defendant/Appellant Chamnap In respectfully 
requests that in interpreting Section 76-10-503(3)(a)(i), this Court rule that the term 
"convicted" means a final judgment. Such an interpretation would render the statute 
inapplicable to Defendant/Appellant in this case. 
In the alternative, if this Court is not inclined to interpret the term "convicted" to 
29 
mean a judgment of conviction, Defendant/Appellant requests that this Court find that 
the conviction in this case denied him due process of law. Also, the statute is susceptible 
to multiple interpretations, it fails to provide adequate notice of the restricted status, and 
broad application of the statute interferes with a person's right to keep and bear arms. 
As a remedy in this case, Defendant/Appellant is seeking reversal of the 
conviction and dismissal of the underlying charge. 
SUBMITTED this /L day of < 9 ^ - ^ , 2000. 
INDA M. JONE$ 
Counsel for Defendant/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, LINDA M. JONES, hereby certify that I have caused to be hand delivered an 
original and 7 copies of the foregoing to the Utah Court of Appeals, 450 South State, 
5th Floor, 140230, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230 and 4 copies to the Attorney 
General's Office, Heber M. Wells Building, 160 East 300 South, 6th Floor, P.O. Box 
140854, this iu day of Q ^ ^ .
 7 2000. 
r4tffal Tfarfpx. 
LINDA M.JONES 
DELIVERED to the Utah Attorney General's Office and the Utah Court of 
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DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date"of birth: January ^ 10,1980 
VideoJv. f. 
Tape' 'Number: 1 Tape Count: 2:00 
CHARGES 
A-*i^ *.*rf,^ ' 
1. PURCH/POSS DANGEROUS WEAPON - 3rd Degree Felony -"'- •"'" 
f;;j>s;Plea:r Guilty - Disposition: 08/02/1999 Guilty Plea ': 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant•s conviction of PURCH/POSS DANGEROUS WEAPON 
a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate 
term of not to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison. 
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately. 
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
Paae 1 
Case No: ,981905876 
Date:—— Auq 02,^ -1999 
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
Sentence is to run consecutively with the sentence imposed by Judge 
Lewis. 
SENTENCE TRUST 
The defendant is to pay "the following: 
Attorney Fees: Amount: $500.00 Plus Interest 
Pay in behalf of: SALT-LAKE COUNTY 
Dated this 2- day of k^LLL 
*c 
.,- 19 T\ 
/ ^ \ J/ V- JZ&Z A«r*w \ ^ v 
/ A /t^ >•"- JNh v&i 
Si^ SlDRA PEULER ^ o ^ 
.strict Court Judge "%<B 
Paae 2 (last) 
ADDENDUM B 
76-10-503. Purchase or possession of dangerous 
weapon/handgun — Persons not permitted to 
have — Penalties. 
(1) (a) Any person who has been convicted of any crime of violence under 
the laws of the United States, this state, or any other state, government, 
or country, or who is addicted to the use of any narcotic drug, or who has 
been declared mentally incompetent may not own or have in his posses-
sion or under his custody or control any dangerous weapon as defined in 
Section 76-10-501. 
(b) Any person who violates this subsection is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor, and if the dangerous weapon is a firearm or sawed-off 
shotgun, he is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(2) (a) Any person who is on parole or probation for a felony may not have 
in his possession or under his custody or control any dangerous weapon as 
defined in Section 76-10-501. 
(b) Any person who violates this subsection is guilty of a third degree 
felony, but if the dangerous weapon is a firearm, explosive, or incendiary 
device he is guilty of a second degree felony. 
(3) (a) A person may not purchase, possess, or transfer any handgun 
described in this part who: 
(i) has been convicted of any felony offense under the laws of the 
United States, this state, or any other state; 
(ii) is under indictment; 
(iii) is an unlawful user of a controlled substance as defined in 
Section 58-37-2; 
(iv) is a drug dependent person as defined in Section 58-37-2; 
(v) has been adjudicated as mentally defective, as provided in the 
Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 103-159, 107 
Stat. 1536 (1993), or has been committed to a mental institution; 
(vi) is an alien who is illegally or unlawfully in the United States; 
(vii) has been discharged from the Armed Forces under dishonor-
able conditions; or 
(viii) is a person who, having been a citizen of the United States, 
has renounced such citizenship, 
(b) Any person who violates this Subsection (3) is guilty of a third 
degree felony. 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
AMENDMENT XIV 
Section Section 
1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of 
protection.] the Confederacy and claims not 
2. [Representatives — Power to reduce ap- to be paid.] 
pointment] 5. [Power to enforce amendment.] 
3. [Disqualification to hold office.] 
Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 
protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Sec. 2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appoint-
ment.] 
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to 
their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each 
State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election 
for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the United States, 
Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial Officers of a State, or 
the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabit-
ants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United 
States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other 
crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion 
which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of 
male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State. 
Sec. 3. [Disqualification to hold office.] 
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or Elector of 
President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the 
United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a 
member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of 
any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to 
support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrec-
tion or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies 
thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such 
disability. 
Sec. 4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of the 
Confederacy and claims not to be paid.] 
The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, 
including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in 
suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the 
United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation in-
curred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any 
claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations, 
and claims shall be held illegal and void. 
Sec. 5. [Power to enforce amendment.] 
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the 
